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Abstract 
While there is a vigorous academic and policy debate about the implications of the Incurred Loss Model 
(ILM) for financial stability, there is no empirical evidence on whether the Expected Loss Model (ELM) 
recently introduced by IASB benefits international investors. We address this relevant issue by 
investigating the price reaction to announcements related to the new rules for Loan Loss Provision (LLP) 
incorporated in IFRS 9 on a sample of 137 European listed banks for the period from November 2009 to 
July 2014. We provide evidence that the abnormal returns related to these events are substantially 
uncorrelated with proxies of timely loss recognition, earnings management, and capital management, 
suggesting that the new ELM is not perceived to bring about substantial benefits as compared to the ILM. 
These results are robust to confounding events, international media coverage, and winsorizing techniques. 
Bootstrap analysis supports the hypothesis that significant results for some of the events and some of the 
proxies may be due to over-sized tests for the sample period under examination. Our findings shed light on 
a recent claim in the literature that the quality of financial statements bears at best second-order effects on 
firm value. 
 
Keywords: earnings management; IFRS 9; impairment; loan loss provisions; stock market 
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis has urged standard setters and regulators to reexamine the role of 
governance practices and accounting standards (Financial Crisis Advisory Group, 2009). 
On July 24, 2014, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued the 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 – Financial Instruments, to replace (IAS) 39 
–Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. The IFRS 9 replaces the Incurred Loss 
Model (ILM) approach for impairment of loans and other financial assets, as defined by IAS 39 
with a new Expected Loss Model (ELM). 
The adoption of the ELM is expected to carry important consequences in terms of disclosure 
of information on the value of financial assets. In particular, it may provide the preparers of the 
financial statements with more discretion in loan loss recognition. Such discretion is deemed 
necessary because the ILM has been criticized due to its inability to recognize loan losses timely 
(Financial Stability Forum, 2009; Laux 2012; O'Hanlon, 2013). The main reason for this inability 
is the need for objective evidence of impairment before a loss is recognized. Bank managers can 
thus postpone the recognition of losses and evade (albeit momentarily) market discipline. This 
problem has led to a vigorous international policy debate about potential implications of the ILM 
for procyclicality and financial stability (Financial Stability Forum, 2009; Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2009; Financial Crisis Advisory Group, 2009; Beatty and Liao, 2011; Vyas, 
2011; Laux, 2012).  
Academics argue that the ILM has been an important factor contributing to the deterioration 
of transparency of banks’ financial statements in the run-up and during the financial crisis (Laux 
and Leuz, 2010; Beatty and Liao, 2011; Laux, 2012). Moreover, policymakers as well as 
practitioners have raised vocal concerns about the high complexity and difficult application of 
IAS 39, especially for firms holding large amounts of financial assets, namely banks (Financial 
stability Forum, 2009).  
The IASB and international policymakers have emphasized the key role of ELM in improving 
investor confidence in banks’ balance sheets (IASB, 2014). Therefore, the ELM is expected to 
have a massive impact on the European banking system and, because of the potential negative 
externalities of financial instability, on the European economy as a whole. 
Are the new accounting rules for loan loss provisions able to restore the confidence of market 
participants in the transparency and integrity of financial reporting? Do investors perceive the 
possibility to recognize losses earlier as critically important to increase shareholder value? We 
aim to answer these questions by investigating how international investors perceive the potential 
impact of this new accounting reform.  
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These questions are important because there is currently a debate among scholars about the 
possibility to improve firm value through better accounting quality (Zimmerman, 2013). In 
particular, while some scholars have found evidence of capital markets effects resulting from 
IFRS adoption, others claim that CFOs consider financial reporting as a simple compliance 
exercise and are unlikely to put considerable effort into improving financial reports to increase 
firm value (Dichev, 2014).  
While there are already contributions on how the loan loss provisioning accounting rules may 
affect the macroeconomy (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Beatty and 
Liao, 2011; Cohen et al., 2014), there is no empirical evidence on how international investors 
react to the new ELM approach introduced by IASB. In particular, while the ELM is expected to 
increase the timeliness of loss recognition (because of its forward-looking nature), the higher 
degree of discretion with respect to the ILM (which is, essentially, backward looking) may enable 
banks to manipulate earnings and/or capital ratios through changes in loan loss provisions 
(Domikowsky et al., 2014).  
As reported in Table 1,1 there are already contributions on the potential effects of forward-
looking loan loss provisioning, for instance on bank risk-taking (Bushman and Williams, 2012). 
Most of existing literature has focused on the ILM under IAS 39 (among others, Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas, 2011; O'Hanlon, 2013). Among the studies reported in Table 1, Armstrong et 
al. (2010) is the only one that has investigated IAS 39 from a “capital markets” perspective. 
However, this study examines the market reaction to IFRS as a whole, and only some of the 
announcements selected by the authors refer to the adoption of IAS 39. 
[Insert Table 1: Papers about international impairment accounting rules and/or earning 
smoothing in banks.] 
In this study, we employ standard event study methodology to investigate the cross-sectional 
determinants of the price reaction to 13 events related to the impairment rules incorporated in the 
standard-setting process of IFRS 9 for a sample of 137 listed banks located in 17 European 
countries for the period between 12 November 2009 and 24 July 2014.  
Our main contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we illustrate a novel strategy to capture 
timely loss recognition, earnings management, and capital management, based on proxies 
previously employed by the literature. Second, we provide novel evidence on the capital market 
effects (or lack thereof) of IFRS, with particular reference to new ELM rules, in the European 
banking industry. This literature is still in its infancy, but we strongly believe it will grow quickly 
                                                             
1 We are aware that the studies reported in Table 1 do not represent a comprehensive literature review on 
earnings management in banks or IAS 39. We report the studies that, in our opinion, provide good examples 
of the importance of the topic we intend to investigate.  
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once IFRS 9 loan loss provisions rules are mandatory adopted across Europe and the world. Our 
findings suggest that the ELM is not perceived to bring about substantial benefits as compared to 
the ILM. While we find evidence that some of the proxies chosen affect the investor reaction to 
some of the 13 announcements, in most cases stock returns tend to be lower for banks that are 
likely to engage in earnings and capital management, contrary to the hypothesis that the ELM 
should benefit international investors. Besides, bootstrap analysis supports the hypothesis that 
significant results for some of the events and some of the proxies may be due to over-sized tests 
for the sample period under examination. These findings are relevant because they shed light on 
a recent claim that the quality of financial reporting bears at best second-order effects on firm 
value (Zimmerman, 2013): overall, it appears that the new loan loss provisions rules had little or 
no effect on bank stock prices. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the 
institutional background by comparing the key features of the impairment accounting rules under 
IAS 39 and IFRS 9 and by describing the IFRS 9 adoption events related to impairment 
accounting rules. Section 3 describes our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our methodology and 
sample. Section 5 discusses the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Regulatory background 
 
2.1. The incurred loss model (IAS 39) and the expected loss model (IFRS 9) 
 
During the financial crisis 2007-2009, an international debate arose about the role of IAS 39 
– Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement and its implications for financial 
reporting and financial stability (Barth and Landsman, 2010; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 
2011; Laux 2012; O'Hanlon, 2013). Criticism against IAS 39 has emphasized its high complexity 
and difficult application which might be detrimental to the level of transparency of financial 
statements (Financial Crisis Advisory Group, 2009; Fiechter, 2011; Paananen, 2012). Much of 
the international debate has targeted the ILM, which requires recognizing only losses incurred as 
of the balance sheet date, leading to delayed recognition of future expected losses (Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas, 2011; O'Hanlon, 2013). Delayed recognition of large credit losses has been 
identified by regulators and policymakers as a weakness in international accounting standards 
that has exacerbated the severity and length of the financial crisis (IASB, 2014). These concerns 
are particularly intense for banks, because they are more sensitive to loan loss provisioning rules. 
Consistent with these concerns, regulators and policymakers have solicited the IASB to 
consider a forward-looking method (Financial Stability Forum, 2009, Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervisor, 2009; Financial Crisis Advisory Group, 2009). Due to political pressure, in 
2009 the IASB proposed to replace IAS 39 with IFRS 9.  Following calls for a global solution, 
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the IASB started to work with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) for a convergent 
approach in impairment accounting rules. However, convergence efforts have been unsuccessful. 
The IASB decided to split the IFRS 9 project into three different phases (1. Classification and 
measurement, 2. Impairment and 3. Hedge accounting). The final version of IFRS 9 was issued 
on July 24, 2014 and it is mandatory effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2018. 
IASB argues that one of biggest improvements of the new accounting rules for financial 
instruments is related to the impairment model (IASB, 2014). This chapter was issued in the final 
version of IFRS 9, on July 24, 2014, and it provides an alternative impairment method that should 
address investors’ concerns about previous version of IAS 39: IFRS 9 requires companies to 
recognize expected losses from when they first lend money or invest in financial instruments. The 
threshold for recognizing lifetime expected losses (expected shortfalls in contractual cash flows) 
is lower than for IAS 39: rather than delaying provisioning until financial assets are close to 
default, the new IFRS 9 demands recognition when the credit quality of the financial instrument 
deteriorates significantly since the initial recognition. Table 2 reports the main differences in the 
impairment models according to IFRS 9 and IAS 39. 
[Insert Table 2: IFRS 9 versus IAS 39: main differences in impairment rules] 
2.2. IFRS 9 impairment event dates 
 
We identify the timeline of events related to IFRS 9 impairment rules considering the news 
and press release related to public announcements provided by the IASB and European Financial 
Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG). These announcements are strictly related to the standard-
setting process of IFRS 9 for Europe, because under EU accounting regulation each IFRS has to 
be approved through a specific procedure called “endorsement mechanism”, which requires that 
EFRAG provides recommendations to the European Commission for the endorsement of IFRS in 
Europe. 
In Table 3, we report the events associated with IFRS 9 that refer to changes in impairment 
accounting rules. To control for potentially confounding events, we use the LEXIS/NEXIS 
database to scour concurrent capital markets news during each event window. In line with recent 
literature (Joos and Leung, 2013; Prather-Kinsey and Tanyi, 2014), for each event we evaluate 
the potential impact of the event on the likelihood of adopting the new impairment accounting 
rules.2 Two events are likely to have decreased such likelihood:  
                                                             
2 For events related impairment rules until December 2012, we maintain the same interpretation as in Onali 
and Ginesti (2014). The authors also report a confounding event on August 5, 2011, when S&P downgrade 
U.S. sovereign credit rating. 
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1) In April 8, 2011, the comment letter issued by EFRAG did not support the proposals to 
set a “floor” that reflects credit losses expected to occur within the foreseeable future, 
and urged the IASB to clarify some points of the revised impairment model prior to 
finalizing the standard;  
2) On August 4, 2011, IASB published a proposal in the form of ED to defer the mandatory 
effective date of IFRS 9 from 1 January 2013 to January 2015.  
 [Insert Table 3: IFRS 9 impairment rules events] 
 
3. Testable predictions 
3.1 Overall market reaction to the new regulation  
In this section we develop testable empirical predictions for how bank share prices are likely 
to react to the events that signaled potential changes in international accounting rules for LLP. 
Subsequently, we also discuss how a series of proxies for timely-loss recognition, earnings 
management, and capital management are likely to correlate with the cross-sectional variation of 
stock price returns. 
Previous empirical studies investigate the use of LLP to manage earnings and capital levels 
(Beatty et al., 1995; Kanagaretnama, 2005; Bushman and Williams, 2012) or the relation between 
LLP and economic cycle (Bouvatier and Lepetit , 2008; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003) As reported 
in Table 1, a number of studies investigate the role of accounting standards in the measurement 
and transparency of LLP and the associated effects on banks’ lending behavior and financial 
stability. 
The new IFRS 9 is likely to engender share price reactions for several reasons. Introducing 
ELM aims to correct banks’ timing choices in the recognition of impairment for financial 
instruments. Share prices may respond positively to this new regulation to the extent that the 
timely and early recognition of impairment losses into financial statements is perceived by 
investors as improving their ability to evaluate bank soundness, specifically with respect to the 
quality of their loan portfolio. The recognition of expected losses under new IFRS 9 is 
substantially different from the current provisioning rules. The ILM adopted by IAS 39 is viewed 
as a contributor in increasing the pro-cyclicality effect during recent financial turmoil (El Sood, 
2012; Beatty and Liao, 2011; Financial Stability Forum, 2009). Specifically, regulators argue that 
ILM contribute to pro-cyclicality by increasing the tendency of banks to increase (decrease) LLP 
during recessionary (expansionary) periods (Financial Stability Forum, 2009; Financial Crisis 
Advisory Group, 2009). Therefore, the ILM indirectly accentuates bank instability during 
recessionary periods, and moving to the ELM should ameliorate such problem.  
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These arguments suggest that the changes in the probability of ELM replacing ILM will have 
an overall positive effect on the banks' stock prices. For this reason, our first hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H1. Events that increase the probability of adoption of ELM incorporated in IFRS 9 are 
associated with a positive stock price reaction. 
 
On the other hand, if changes in accounting quality bear only second-order effects on 
shareholder value (Zimmerman, 2013), we should expect that the ELM adoption events do not 
bear any significant effect on bank share prices. 
 
3.2 What explains the cross-sectional variation in stock price returns? 
 
In this section we develop hypotheses aiming to investigate whether bank-specific variables 
help explain the cross-sectional variation in stock price reactions. Such analysis is also relevant 
from the perspective of regulators and policymakers because it enables authorities to understand 
whether the new ELM is perceived by market participants as enhancing the timeliness of 
recognition of credit losses in financial statements, as well as reducing the probability of earnings 
and capital management. 
In principle, the new ELM should incorporate more forward-looking information relative to 
the ILM. This means that application of IFRS 9 will require considerable discretion as to how 
changes in macroeconomic factors will affect LLP. Therefore, shareholders of banks with a lower 
level of timely loss recognition should benefit from the new regulation, because the new rules 
should improve the timeliness of loan loss recognition: 
H2: Less timely loss recognition is associated with significant positive stock price 
reactions.  
The new regulation should be well-received by shareholders of banks that attempt to avoid 
reporting large losses. For this reason, as explained in Section 4.1, we choose as proxies for 
timely-loss recognition variables that are related to the reporting of small losses and earnings.3  
The new ELM should incentivize banks to timely recognize losses, because it requires them 
to immediately report even future expected losses. However, this requirement also introduces a 
higher degree of discretion in the allocation of LLP in the short term. Therefore, reducing 
volatility in earnings could actually become easier under the new ELM. This problem is therefore 
likely to be associated with negative reactions for banks that tend to reduce ROA volatility by 
exploiting discretionary components of the LLP, leading to our second hypothesis: 
                                                             
3 We are aware that these proxies may also be related to earnings management (Beatty et al., 2002; 
Paananen et al., 2012). However, since the ILM enables banks to postpone recording large expected losses, 
we believe that these variables are, in our context, more suitable to proxy for timely loss recognition. In 
any case, we believe the different terminology does not affect the substance of our analysis.  
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H3: A higher level of earnings management is associated with negative stock price 
reactions. 
As discussed more in detail in Section 4.1, to test the validity of H2 we employ proxies related 
to the discretionary components of LLP, the portion of earnings volatility due to changes in LLP, 
and the skewness of stock returns, which has been found to be positively correlated with late 
disclosure of bad news (Bae et al., 2006). 
Finally, we also explore capital management, which can occur because of the close link 
between the LLP and the regulatory capital ratios in the banking industry (Ahmed et al.,1999). 
The relationship between LLP and regulatory capital ratios has been an important theme in the 
banking literature (Moyer, 1990; Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 1995), and there is evidence 
that LLP are manipulated to reduce regulatory costs resulting from violation of capital 
requirements (Beatty et al., 1995). Similar to what said above with respect to H2, the new ELM 
may facilitate manipulation of LLP in the short term, and may be more costly for shareholders of 
banks that already engage in capital management activities, because they increase the level of 
asymmetric information between bank managers and bank shareholders: 
H4: A higher degree of capital management is associated with negative stock price 
reactions. 
4. Methodology and sample characteristics 
4.1 Proxies for timely loss recognition, earnings management and capital management  
The first step of our analysis consists of defining the proxies to capture timely-loss recognition, 
earnings management, and capital management. To this end, we examine the recent accounting 
and finance literature and focus on nine proxies, three for each variable:   
- Timely loss recognition: banks dislike reporting small losses, and they may manipulate 
accounts to report small earnings instead (Beatty et al., 2002; Paananen et al., 2012). For 
this reason, recognition of small losses may be delayed. The three proxies: SMALL_INC, 
SMALL_DEC, and SMALL_ROA, are indicator variables based on the return on asset 
(ROA) and the first-difference of ROA (ΔROA = ROAt – ROAt-1). Small decreases or 
increases in ROA (that is, SMALL_INC or SMALL_DEC is equal to one) or small earnings 
(SMALL_ROA) suggest that the recognition of losses may have been delayed. A more 
detailed definition of these three proxies is reported in Table 4.   
- Earnings management: our proxies are based on an adaptation of the accounting-based 
definitions of discretionary loan loss provisions provided by Gebhardt and Novotny-
Farkas (2011) and Norden and Stoian (2014), and on a market-based measure introduced 
by Bae et al. (2006). The first measure, DISCR_NI, is based on the following model for 
bank i (for a total of N banks) and year t: 
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      (1) 
Where NI stands for net income, NPL for non-performing (impaired) loans, LOANS stands 
for gross loans, εit is an error term, and stands for the linear prediction of NI (the 
fitted values from the regression). We estimate (1) with bank fixed-effects and we cluster 
the standard errors at the bank level. Intuitively, the larger DISCR_NI, the larger the 
discretionary component of loan loss provisions, and therefore net income, that does not 
depend on non-performing loans and gross loans.  
 
The second measure is based on the standard deviation of earnings before loan loss 
provisions and taxes minus the standard deviation of earnings, scaled by total assets: 
    (2) 
Where LLP stands for loan loss provisions, E stands for earnings and EBT stands for 
earnings before tax. Therefore, the larger VOLE_RATIO, the higher the volatility of LLP 
relative to earnings, suggesting LLP manipulation to reduce earnings volatility.  
 
Finally, our third measure for earnings management is the monthly skewness of daily stock 
returns, SKEW_RET. Because of the tendency for firms which engage in earnings 
management to delay the disclosure of bad news, SKEW_RET tends to be positive for 
these firms (Bae et al., 2006). The higher SKEW_RET, the higher the degree of earnings 
management.4   
 
- Capital management: our first two proxies for capital management are similar to 
DISCR_NI. However, in this case the dependent variables for the main regressions are the 
total regulatory capital ratio (TCR), or the ratio of total regulatory capital divided by risk-
weighted assets, and the tier 1 capital ratio, or the ratio of tier 1 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets:5 
   (3) 
                                                             
4 For low levels of earnings management, SKEW_RET can also take on negative values. 
5 Because our sample covers the period from 2009 to 2014, these ratios are defined as per Basel II accord 
requirements. 
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  (4) 
 
Our third proxy, CLOSE_REG is a binary variable constructed on the basis of the 
proximity of these TCR and TIER1 to the regulatory minimum: banks that are closer to 
these minimum requirements have stronger incentives to engage in capital management 
activities. Proximity to the minimum regulatory ratios can, for example, affect a bank’s 
capital structure and dividend payout ratio (Gropp and Heider, 2010; Onali, 2014).  
Table 4 reports a brief description of each of our nine proxies. The proxies DISCR_NI, 
VOLE_RATIO, SKEW_RET, DISCR_TCR and DISCR_TIER1 are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile.   
[Insert Table 4: Measures of timely loss recognition, earnings management, and capital 
management.] 
4.2 Indices calculation 
Because of the lack of homogeneity across studies in the proxies used for timely loss 
recognition, earnings management, and capital management, it is hard to compare previous 
findings (Leuz et al., 2003; Kanagaretnam et al., 2005; Dechow et al., 2010; Filip and Raffournier, 
2014; Cohen et al., 2014). We create three indices, one for each variable considered, on the basis 
of the nine proxies described in section 3.1. For each category, we define the index as the sum of 
three binary variables constructed on the basis of the three proxies within each category. While 
we do not argue that these measures are perfect, they help increase the robustness of our results. 
We propose these measures as a first stab to reduce the numbers of proxies used by different 
studies in a European setting.  
For timely loss recognition, we define INDEX_LOSS as follows: 
INDEX_LOSSit = SMALL_INCit + SMALL_ROAit + SMALL_DECit    (5) 
 
A higher value for INDEX_LOSS indicates less timely loss recognition. 
For earnings management and capital management, we construct six binary variables based 
on whether the values of each of the proxy for bank i is above or below the median value over the 
sample period. Then, we aggregate each of the three binary variables within each category. For 
earnings management, we have: 
INDEX_Eit = H_DISCR_NIit + H_VOLE_RATIOit + H_SKEW_RETit    (6) 
it
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Where H_DISCR_NI is a dummy variable equal to one if DISCR_NI is larger than the sample 
median, and zero otherwise. H_VOLE_RATIO and H_SKEW_RET are constructed in a similar 
manner, using VOLE_RATIO and SKEW_RET instead of DISCR_NI. 
A higher value for INDEX_E indicates a higher degree of earnings management. 
For capital management, we construct the following variable: 
INDEX_CAPit = H_DISCR_TCRit + H_DISCR_TIER1it + CLOSE_REGit   (7) 
 
Where H_DISCR_TCR (H_DISCR_TIER) is a dummy variable equal to one if DISCR_TCR 
(H_DISCR_TIER1) is larger than the sample median, and zero otherwise, and CLOSE_REG is 
the same dummy variable defined in Table 4.  
A higher value for INDEX_CAP indicates a higher degree of capital management. 
In a preliminary analysis to test the validity of these indices as proxies of timely loss 
recognition, earnings management, and capital management, we run a probit model where the 
three indices are the independent variables and the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one 
if the bank is located in Germany, and zero otherwise. German banks are allowed to build hidden 
reserves under Section 340f of the German Commercial Code, and these reserves are generally 
employed as an earnings management device (Bornemann et al., 2012). Therefore, German banks 
are, ceteris paribus, more likely to engage in earnings smoothing than banks located in other 
countries. All three indices enter the regression with positive and significant coefficients, 
consistent with the view that these indices correlate positively with earnings smoothing. We also 
run a probit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy variable if the bank is located 
in a code law country (either the UK or Ireland, in our dataset), and the independent variables are 
the three indices. Banks which are domiciled in code law countries are less likely to engage in 
earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003). Consistent with expectations, all three indices enter the 
regression with a negative coefficient, although the coefficient on INDEX_CAP is insignificant.  
4.3 Estimating abnormal returns 
In line with literature that employs event study methodology to assess the market reaction to 
changes in accounting rules (Armstrong et al., 2010; Joos and Leung, 2013), we estimate for each 
of the 13 events the Market Adjusted Return (MAR), or the difference between the three-day 
cumulative log return centered on the event date for each the 137 bank stocks in our sample and 
the corresponding three-day cumulative log return of our proxy for the market portfolio. The 
MAR for the two events that we believe to have had a negative effect on the likelihood of IFRS 
9 adoption are multiplied by minus one (Armstrong et al., 2010). For comparison with recent 
empirical studies on the market reaction to IFRS, we choose the DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index 
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Ex Europe which includes the 1,800 world largest international firms excluding the European 
firms in the index (to avoid including large European banks in our benchmark). This proxy 
enables us to allow for macroeconomic events that have affected the global economy as a whole. 
Moreover, we also employ an alternative benchmark, a value-weighted portfolio of 5,069 non-
financial listed firms domiciled in the 17 European countries under investigation. This proxy 
captures macroeconomic events that are specific to Europe. 
While there is currently no consensus in the literature with regard to which is the best model 
for estimating abnormal returns, using the market-adjusted model has several advantages in 
comparison with other models such as, for example, the market model (MacKinlay, 1997):6 it is 
not affected by bias due to significant events in the estimation period (Fuller et al., 2002),7 and 
for short event-windows models it produces estimates for the abnormal returns which have 
comparable precision to that of the market model (Brown and Warner, 1980). We focus on a 
three-day event window based on recent literature (Joos and Leung, 2013; Prather-Kinsey and 
Tanyi, 2014), because such a short event window reduces the impact of potentially concurrent 
events (which become more likely as the event window widens). Moreover, using a three-day 
window, rather than simply the event dates, avoids bias generated by different trading hours 
across the 17 stock markets under investigation (which may cause certain events to be priced only 
the day after the event in some exchanges but not others), and allows for possible information 
leakages occurred on the day before the event is released to the public. 
4.4 The cross-sectional determinants of abnormal returns 
To investigate the impact of timely loss recognition, earnings management, and capital 
management on our proxy for abnormal returns, the MAR, we run bank-level regressions where 
the dependent variable is the MAR for each bank i and event e: 
  (8) 
Where X is one of the nine proxies or one of the three indices described in section 3.1 and 
section 3.2; SMB and HML, are the size and book-to-market Fama and French (1993) factors, 
respectively, while WML is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor;8 and are Dd are four weekday 
dummies that allow for day-of-the-week effects (Kaplanski and Levy, 2010), where d = 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 and:  
                                                             
6 The market-adjusted model can be seen as a specific case of the market model, where the intercept of the 
regression is set equal to zero and the slope coefficient (the beta) is set equal to one. 
7 Because our sample period covers part of the global financial crisis and all the period related to the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the probability of significant events in the estimation period is very high.  
8  We have download these three factors for Europe from Kenneth French website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f-f_developed.html 

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Dd = 1  if d = 2 for Tuesdays, d = 3 for Wednesdays, d = 4 for Thursdays, and d = 5 for 
Fridays.  
Dd = 0 otherwise. 
In all our estimations, we include bank fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the bank 
level. To reduce the effect of multicollinearity, which increases the probability of insignificant 
coefficients, we run 12 regressions according to equation (8), one for each of our proxies for 
timely loss recognition, earnings management, and capital management. We also run a regression 
with all of the three indices, for a total of 13 regressions. 
To increase the robustness of our results, we also run the regressions without bank fixed 
effects, with double-clustering of the standard errors at both country and event level (Petersen, 
2009). 
Finally, to explore whether certain events were more important than others, we also run the 
regressions separately for each event. In this case, of course, we omit Fama-French and Carhart 
factors and weekday dummies as they do not vary across panels. 
4.5 Sample characteristics 
We start our sample selection by selecting from Bankscope all listed banks from 17 European 
countries that are mandatory IFRS adopters and that have been used in recent empirical studies 
(Chen et al., 2013).9 This selection criterion leads to 394 banks, but for 19 of these banks even 
basic financial data, such as total assets and net income, is missing. For the remaining 375 banks, 
we collect closing daily stock prices from Datastream. Data on the regulatory capital ratios is 
available for 242 banks only. After excluding banks for which there is unavailable data for any 
of the proxies listed in Table 4, we obtain a sample of 137 banks: 6 from Austria, 2 from Belgium, 
20 from Denmark, 3 from Finland, 9 from France, 14 from Germany, 3 from Greece, 1 from 
Ireland, 20 from Italy, 4 from Luxembourg, 3 from the Netherlands, 15 from Norway, 4 from 
Portugal, 5 from Spain, 3 from Sweden, 18 from Switzerland, and 7 from the United Kingdom.    
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for our proxies of timely loss recognition, earnings 
management, and capital management. 
[Insert Table 5: Descriptive statistics for proxies of timely loss recognition, earnings 
management, and capital management.] 
                                                             
9 To avoid sample selection bias due to attrition, we include banks that were delisted over the sample period. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Main results 
As a preliminary analysis, we estimate the average 3-day MAR for the 13 events for all 137 
banks in our sample. When using as a benchmark the DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex Europe, 
we obtain an average 3-day MAR equal to 0.8%, insignificant at any conventional level (with a 
t-statistic equal to 1.746). When using as a benchmark the value-weighted portfolio of 5,069 non-
financial firms, we obtain an even smaller average 3-day MAR (0.5%), insignificant at any 
conventional level (with a t-statistic equal to 1.631). As shown in Figure 1-i and 1-ii, most of the 
positive reaction occurs for event two, related to a joint proposal by IASB and FASB on credit 
impairment of loans and other financial assets. Therefore, there is little, if any, support to H1.   
Are these results actually a consequence of the new international impairment rules? To answer 
this question, we explore more in detail how our proxies of timely loss recognition, earnings 
management and capital management explain the cross-section of the MAR. This investigation is 
necessary because the simple univariate analysis reported above cannot separate the effect of the 
global financial crisis and of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis from that of IFRS announcements, 
because all these phenomena can impose a system-wide impact (Prather-Kinsey and Tanyi, 2014). 
A deeper analysis than a univariate analysis of the MAR is necessary to pinpoint the drivers of 
the MAR.   
We report our main results, using DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex Europe as a benchmark, 
in Table 6. Panel A reports the results for the regressions with bank fixed effects and clustering 
of the standard errors at the bank level. Panel B reports the results for the regressions without 
bank fixed effects and clustering of the standard error at both the country and event level. All of 
our proxies enter our regressions with insignificant coefficients, regardless of the specification 
considered. Since the total number of observations is 1,319, it is unlikely that this lack of 
significance is due to a small number of observations. The results for the regressions using the 
value-weighted portfolio of 5,069 European non-financial firms are reported in Table 7, Panel A 
and Panel B. Apart from the coefficient for SMALL_INC in Panel A, all coefficients are 
insignificant, corroborating the results reported in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6: Main regression results (benchmark: DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex 
Europe).] 
[Insert Table 7: Main regression results (benchmark: value-weighted portfolio of 5,069 
European non-financial firms).] 
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In Table 8 we report the results, using the DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex Europe as proxy 
for the market portfolio, for regressions run separately for each of the 13 events and each proxy 
for timely loss recognition, earnings management, and capital management. The specification of 
each regression is the same as that for equation (8), although the Fama-French and Carhart factors 
and weekday dummies are excluded because they do not vary across banks, with Huber-White 
robust standard errors. Blank cells indicate lack of significance at the 5% level. 
Only for five cases out of 156 do we obtain significant and positive coefficients for any of the 
12 proxies and 13 events considered. In 18 cases, we obtain instead significant and negative 
coefficients.  
Some of the events under examination seem to bear little or impact on our proxies of timely 
loss recognition, earnings management, and capital management. For events one, seven, eight, 
and twelve none of the coefficients is significant at the 5% level. Seven events (number two, three, 
five, six, nine, ten, and eleven) are associated with three or less significant coefficients. Only two 
events have more than three proxies with significant coefficients (of either sign): events number 
four and thirteen. For event number four, five proxies have positive and significant coefficients 
(as said above, these are the only five cases with significant and positive coefficients), and one 
has a negative and significant coefficient. For event number thirteen, which effectively represents 
the issuance of IFRS 9, there are four significant (and negative) coefficients.   
The coefficients for the proxies INDEX_LOSS, SMALL_ROA, VOLE_RATIO, and 
SKEW_RET are insignificant for all thirteen events. The proxies for which there is the largest 
number of significant results are the four proxies for capital management (four events are 
associated with significant coefficients). For CLOSE_REG, there are negative and significant 
coefficients for four of the 13 events. For the other three proxies for capital management 
(INDEX_CAP, DISCR_TCR, and DISCR_TIER1), three coefficients are significantly negative, 
while one is significantly positive. For the proxies on timely loss recognition the results seem to 
suggest a negative reaction (if any): the coefficients on SMALL_INC and SMALL_DEC are 
significant only for two events (for each variable) and in three out of four instances these 
coefficients are negative. There are only three cases with significant coefficients for proxies of 
earnings management, and two of them are related to negative coefficients. Overall, these results 
provide very little support to the view that the new international accounting regulation on 
impairment of loans and financial assets will decrease problems related to earnings and capital 
management. 
When we repeat the estimations using as a benchmark the value-weighted portfolio of 5,069, 
the results are virtually the same (see Table 9).  
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[Insert Table 8: Results for separate regressions for each event (benchmark: DJ STOXX 
Global 1800 Index Ex Europe).] 
[Insert Table 9: Results for separate regressions for each event (benchmark: value-weighted 
portfolio of 5,069 European non-financial firms).] 
We run further regressions to test the robustness of our results. All of these results are available 
upon request from the authors.  
5.2 Robustness tests 
First, we address the potential impact of confounding events and the lack of coverage in 
international media. We run our main regressions after excluding the sixth event, because of a 
potential confounding event on 5th August 2011. This results in a drop in the number of 
observations from 1,319 to 1,227. The results are virtually the same as those reported in Table 6 
and Table 7, for both Panel A and Panel B. We then repeat this analysis after excluding the 10th 
event (9th July 2013), because we did not find international media coverage for this event, and 
therefore change in the MAR may be related to events unrelated to the new impairment 
accounting rules. The number of observations is reduced to 1,204, but the results remain 
unaltered.   
Second, we employ bootstrap simulations to understand whether the lack of significant results 
is due to an under-sized test for the sample period under examination (that is, the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true is less than the theoretical value). We repeat 
the estimation of the regressions for 250 randomly selected non-overlapping non-event trading 
days over the sample period from 3 July, 2009, to 5 August, 2014 (1328 trading days). Since on 
these days there were no events related to the adoption of IFRS 9 impairment rules, the null 
hypothesis is true. We find evidence of over-rejection of the null hypothesis for all of the 12 
proxies. In particular, regardless of what proxy we employ as a benchmark, we find that the type 
I error for the 5% significance level ranges between 9.6% (for DISCR_NI) and 32% (for 
DISCR_TIER1). Therefore, it is likely that the significant coefficients reported in Table 8 for 
some of the proxies are due to an over-sized test over the sample period considered, leading to a 
rejection of the null hypothesis in cases when it is actually true. 
Third, we examine whether our results could be a byproduct of misspecification of the model 
employed to measure abnormal returns (the market-adjusted model), or an invalid proxy for the 
market portfolio. We estimate the 3-day MAR around Mario Draghi's speech on July 26, 2012, 
during which he pledged to do "whatever it takes" to support the Euro. If our method to measure 
abnormal returns is correct, we should expect that banks in Eurozone countries should have 
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reacted more positively to this event than banks in non-Eurozone countries (Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom). We examine the differential stock price reaction of 
banks in the Eurozone to those outside of the Eurozone. In particular, we run a two-sample t-test 
with unequal variances to test whether the average 3-day MAR for Eurozone countries is 
significantly larger than for non-Eurozone countries. The results support this hypothesis, 
regardless of which benchmark is used.10  
Finally, we repeat our main analysis with the variables DISCR_NI, VOLE_RATIO, 
SKEW_RET, DISCR_TCR and DISCR_TIER1 as they are (without winsorizing them at the 1st and 
99th percentile). The results are virtually the same as those reported in Tables 6 and 7. 
6. Conclusions 
While a vigorous international debate has solicited IASB to change the accounting rules for 
loan loss provisioning, the capital markets consequences of adopting the new ELM incorporated 
in IFRS 9 are not obvious. The ELM provides the preparers of financial statements with more 
discretion than the ILM (as defined by IAS 39) in terms of the timing of loan loss recognition, 
which should lead to a more timely recognition of loan losses, but could also make it easier to 
manipulate earnings and regulatory capital ratios.  
This study is a first attempt to understand whether changes in international accounting 
standards for loan loss provisions is an appropriate “cure” to restore investors’ confidence in 
banks’ balance sheets. We employ event study methodology to investigate whether the ELM has 
been perceived by international investors as value-enhancing. We test this hypothesis on a sample 
of 137 European listed banks domiciled in countries that adopt IFRS, encompassing 13 
announcements related to the standard-setting process of IFRS 9 developed in the period 2009-
2014. 
We provide evidence that the abnormal returns related to adoption events for the IFRS 9 
impairment rules are substantially uncorrelated with a number of proxies for timely loss 
recognition, earnings management, and capital management. These findings suggest that the ELM 
is not perceived by international investors to increase the timeliness of loan loss recognition and 
to decrease earnings and capital management by European banks. Unlike prior event studies on 
the IFRS adoption (such as Armstrong et al., 2010; Joos and Leung, 2013; Onali and Ginesti, 
2014; Prather-Kinsey and Tanyi, 2014), our findings do not support the hypothesis that the 
                                                             
10 If we employ the DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex Europe as a benchmark, we have an average 3-day 
MAR for the Eurozone (non-Eurozone) banks equal to 1.83% (0.54%), with a t-statistic equal to 4.897. If 
we use the portfolio of 5,069 European non-financial firms, we obtain an average 3-day MAR for the 
Eurozone (non-Eurozone) banks equal to 0.65% (–0.63%), with a t-statistic equal to 4.839. 
 18 
expected improvement in accounting standards bears a substantial impact on firm value, 
consistent with the recent claim that external financial reporting imposes only second-order 
effects on firm value (Zimmerman, 2013).  
Interpreting our results, however, requires some caution. First, there is still some degree of 
uncertainty among investors regarding the impact of the IFRS 9 impairment accounting rules on 
the reported earnings of European listed banks. To address this issue, European policymakers 
need to intervene to help international investors understand these new rules, by providing 
additional guidance. Second, our findings warrant further research to investigate in greater depth 
the potential negative externalities of the ELM. This research will be possible, however, only 
once the implementation of IFRS 9 rules has taken place. 
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Table 1. Papers about international impairment accounting rules and/or earning 
smoothing in banks.  
                                                             
11 Bushman and Williams (2012) report the number of bank-year observations (3091) but do not report the 
number of banks in the sample. 
Paper Topic Method 
Sample 
composition and 
period 
Main findings 
O'Hanlon (2013) 
 
Effect of IAS 39 
on timeliness of 
loan-loss 
provisioning by 
UK banks 
Regression 
analysis 
212 UK Banks 
Period: 2000-2009 
Overall, the adoption of IAS 
39 does not result in a less 
timely loan loss provisions 
Bushman and 
Williams (2012) 
Effect of 
discretion in loan 
loss provisioning 
on bank risk 
taking 
Regression 
analysis 
Banks from 27 
countries11 
Period: 1995-2006 
Forward-looking loan loss 
provisioning reduces 
(increases) the impact of 
market discipline if its 
purpose is earnings 
smoothing (timely loan loss 
recognition). 
Paananen et al. 
(2012)  
 
Determinants and 
the capital 
market 
consequences of 
banks’ decision 
to reclassify 
financial assets 
under IAS 39 
Regression 
analysis 
95 banks from 38 
countries 
Period: 2007-2008 
Reclassifying banks have 
lower capital adequacy 
ratios, lower profitability and 
higher earnings volatility 
than non-reclassifying banks 
Beatty and Liao 
(2011) 
Effect of delayed 
expected loss 
recognition under 
incurred loss 
model on bank 
lending 
Regression 
analysis 
1,270 US banks 
Delayed loss recognition is 
negatively correlated with 
reductions in lending during 
recessionary periods 
Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas 
(2011) 
Effect of IAS 39 
on earnings 
management in 
banks 
Regression 
analysis 
90 European 
banks 
Period: 2000-2007 
Incurred loss model reduces 
income smoothing and 
delays recognition of future 
expected losses 
Armstrong et al. 
(2010) 
Investor reaction 
to the adoption of 
IFRS (and 
especially IAS 
39) 
Event study 
3,265 European 
listed firms 
Period: 2002-2005 
Incrementally positive 
reaction for firms with lower 
pre-adoption information 
quality, which is more 
pronounced for banks  
Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2008) 
Effect of 
provisioning 
system on credit 
fluctuations 
 
Regression 
analysis 
186 European 
Banks 
Period: 1992-2004 
 
Non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions amplify credit 
fluctuation. Discretionary 
loan loss provisions do not 
affect credit fluctuations 
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Table 1. Papers about international impairment accounting rules and/or earning 
smoothing in banks. (continued) 
 
Kanagaretnam et 
al. (2005) 
Bank loan loss 
provisions 
 
Regression 
analysis 
705 US banks 
Period: 1980-1997 
Bank managers’ propensity 
to signal their private 
information vary cross-
sectionally. Propensity to 
signal correlates negatively 
with bank size and positively 
with earnings variability, 
future investment 
opportunities, and degree of 
income smoothing 
Laeven and 
Majnoni (2003) 
Relation between 
bank loan loss 
provisions and 
business cycle 
 
 
Regression 
analysis 
1,419 banks from 
44 countries 
Period: 1988-1999 
Loan loss provisioning is 
pro-cyclical and can 
exacerbate the impact of the 
economic cycle on banks’ 
profitability and capital 
position 
Beatty et al. 
(2002) 
Earnings 
smoothing to 
avoid earnings 
declines 
Regression 
analysis 
707 publicly held 
US banks and 
1,160 private 
banks 
Period: 1993-2009 
Public banks report fewer 
small decreases in earnings 
than private banks and 
longer string sequences of 
earnings increases 
Ahmed et al. 
(1999) 
 
Capital 
management as a 
determinant of 
loan loss 
provisioning 
 
Regression 
analysis 
113 US Banks 
Period: 1986-1995 
Overall, capital management 
is an important determinant 
of loan loss provisions. 
Earnings management is not 
an important determinant of 
loan loss provisions 
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Table 2.  IFRS 9 versus IAS 39: main impairment requirements. 
IFRS 9  
(Forward-looking impairment model) 
IAS 39  
(Incurred-loss impairment model) 
Impairment recognition: Impairment recognition: 
Three-stage model. Stage 1 (12 month-Expected Credit 
Losses - ELM). It includes financial instruments with high 
credit quality (that have not had a significant increase in 
credit risk since initial recognition or that have low credit 
risk at the reporting date). The amount of impairment 
provision is determined based on 12- month Expected 
Loss (EL).  
Stage 2 (ELM). It includes financial instruments that have 
had a significant increase in credit risk since the initial 
recognition. The amount of impairment provision has to 
be determined based on ELM relating to the remaining 
time to maturity.  
Stage 3 (ELM). It includes financial assets that have 
objective evidence of impairment at the reporting date. 
Lifetime ELM are recognized.  
[IFRS 9, project summary 2014] 
At each balance sheet date, entities have to consider the 
“objective evidence of impairment” when assessing 
whether a financial asset or group of financial assets is to 
be impaired. The loss events that signify impairment must 
be observable. Expected losses as a result of events 
expected to occur after the balance sheet date may not be 
recognized.  
[IAS 39, paragraph 59] 
 A list of non-exclusive ‘trigger events’ that are indicators 
of objective evidence that a financial asset or group of 
assets is impaired are provided by the standard.  
[IAS 39, paragraph 59] 
Measurement: Measurement: 
The measurement of impairment is the same regardless of 
the type of instrument held and how it is classified. 
 [IFRS 9 project summary 2014]  
The measurement of impairment depends on how a 
financial instrument is classified.  
[IAS 39, paragraph 59] 
Disclosure: Disclosure: 
More disclosure to assist investors and analysts to 
understand the amount of expected credit losses and credit 
risk, such as the information that explain the expected 
credit loss calculations, the measurement of expected 
credit losses and the assessment of changes in credit risk. 
[IFRS 9, project summary 2014] 
Disclosures related to IAS 39 are also prescribed in other 
standards (e.g. IFRS 7). 
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Table 3. IFRS 9 impairment rules events. 
Date Event 
Probability 
of adoption 
12  
November 
2009 
IASB issues IFRS 9 (completing the first phase - Classification and Measurement). Increase 
13  
January 2011 
IASB and FASB publish a joint proposal on credit impairment of loans and other financial assets managed 
in an open portfolio. 
Increase 
31  
January 2011 
IASB and FASB publish a joint proposal on accounting for impairment of financial assets such as loans 
managed in an open portfolio. 
Increase 
4  
March 2011 
EFRAG recommends that IASB and FASB agree on a joint timetable to finalize an accounting standard for 
financial instruments. 
Increase 
8  
April 2011 
EFRAG releases the final comment letter to IASB in response to Supplementary Document Financial 
Instruments: Impairment issued on 31 January 2011. 
Decrease 
4  
August 2011 
IASB proposes adjustments to the effective date of IFRS 9 from January 1, 2013 to January 1, 2015. Decrease 
16 December 
2011 
IASB releases amendments that defer the mandatory effective date from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2015. Increase 
27  
January 2012 
IASB and FASB announce their intention to continue to develop a common approach on the impairment 
model. 
Increase 
7  
March 2013 
IASB publishes revised proposals for loan-loss provisioning. Increase 
9  
July 2013 
EFRAG publishes its comment letter in response to IASB Exposure Draft - Financial Instruments: Expected 
Credit Losses. Increase 
22  
July 2013 
 EFRAG reports on the findings of the field-test on IASB Exposure Draft- Financial Instruments: Expected 
Credit Losses. The field-test serves also as an input to the European Commission’s endorsement process. 
Increase 
10  
July 2014 
The president of ECB, Mario Draghi, during the IFRS Foundation Trustees’ meeting in London, urges 
policymakers in Europe to progress swiftly in the adoption of IFRS 9. 
Increase 
24  
July 2014 
IASB issues the final version of IFRS 9. Increase 
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Table 4. Measures of timely loss recognition, earnings management, and capital 
management. 
Proxy Calculation of the proxy Variable proxied Related literature 
SMALL_INC 1 if 0 < ΔROA < 0.0008 
and 0 otherwise 
Timely loss 
recognition  
Beatty et al. (2002) 
SMALL_DEC 1 if -0.0008 < ΔROA < 0 
and 0 otherwise 
Timely loss 
recognition  
Beatty et al. (2002) 
SMALL_ROA    1 if -0.0005 < ROA < 0.0005 
and 0 otherwise 
Timely loss 
recognition 
Paananen et al. (2012) 
DISCR_NI See equation (1)  Earnings 
management 
Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas 
(2011). and Norden and Stoian 
(2013) 
VOLE_RATIO Standard deviation of earnings 
before loan loss provisions and tax 
minus standard deviation of net 
income scaled by total assets – see 
equation (2) 
Earnings 
management 
Norden and Stoian (2014) 
SKEW_RET Skewness of stock returns Earnings 
management 
Bae et al. (2006) 
DISCR_TCR See equation (3) Capital management Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas 
(2011). and Norden and Stoian 
(2014) 
DISCR_TIER1 See equation (4) Capital management Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas 
(2011). and Norden and Stoian 
(2014) 
CLOSE_REG 1 if  
- either TCR ≤ 10%  
- or TIER 1 ratio ≤ 6% 
and 0 otherwise 
Capital management Gropp and Heider (2010) and 
Onali (2014) 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for proxies of timely loss recognition, earnings 
management, and capital management. 
Statistics INDEX_LOSS SMALL_INC SMALL_DEC SMALL_ROA 
     
Mean 0.7900 0.1516 0.1205 0.5178 
St. Dev. 0.7005 0.3588 0.3257 0.4999 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 2.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
Statistics INDEX_E DISCR_NI VOLE_RATIO SKEW_RET 
     
Mean 1.4951 -1.0608 -0.0003 0.0333 
St. Dev. 0.8372 8.7453 0.0048 1.2898 
Minimum 0.0000 -64.8253 -0.0280 -4.9043 
Maximum 3.0000 23.7924 0.0212 4.1921 
 
Statistics INDEX_CAP DISCR_TCR DISCR_TIER1 CLOSE_REG 
     
Mean 1.0637 0.0731 0.1027 0.0644 
St. Dev. 0.8791 0.3962 0.4939 0.2456 
Minimum 0.0000 -0.5353 -0.6646 0.0000 
Maximum 2.0000 2.0327 2.1802 1.0000 
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Table 6. Main regression results (benchmark: DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex Europe). 
PANEL A: With bank fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the bank level  
Dependent variable: 3-day MAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
              
INDEX_LOSS -0.001            -0.002 
 (-0.484)            (-0.551) 
SMALL_INC  0.004            
  (1.584)            
SMALL_DEC   -0.005           
   (-1.215)           
SMALL_ROA    -0.002          
    (-0.597)          
INDEX_E     0.003        0.003 
     (1.528)        (1.604) 
DISCR_NI      0.000        
      (0.663)        
VOLE_RATIO       -2.259       
       (-1.205)       
SKEW_RET        0.001      
        (0.721)      
INDEX_CAP         0.005    0.005 
         (1.339)    (1.389) 
DISCR_TCR          0.014    
          (1.208)    
DISCR_TIER1           0.013   
           (1.052)   
CLOSE_REG            -0.007  
            (-1.595)  
Constant -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006* -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007* -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.010** 
 (-0.253) (-0.941) (-0.440) (-0.207) (-1.760) (-0.664) (-1.103) (-0.760) (-1.658) (-1.211) (-1.216) (-0.595) (-2.280) 
Weekday dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fama-French and Carhart factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 
R-squared 0.061 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.063 0.061 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.061 0.064 
Number of banks 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 
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Table 6. Main regression results (benchmark: DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex Europe). (continued) 
PANEL B: Without bank fixed effects and standard errors double-clustered at the country and event level  
Dependent variable: 3-day MAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
              
INDEX_LOSS -0.000            -0.001 
 (-0.211)            (-0.285) 
SMALL_INC  -0.002            
  (-0.564)            
SMALL_DEC   0.000           
   (0.028)           
SMALL_ROA    -0.000          
    (-0.051)          
INDEX_E     0.001        0.001 
     (0.576)        (0.581) 
DISCR_NI      0.000        
      (0.581)        
VOLE_RATIO       -0.363       
       (-1.270)       
SKEW_RET        0.000      
        (0.268)      
INDEX_CAP         -0.001    -0.001 
         (-0.422)    (-0.440) 
DISCR_TCR          -0.002    
          (-0.622)    
DISCR_TIER1           -0.002   
           (-0.661)   
CLOSE_REG            -0.004  
            (-0.517)  
Constant -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.225) (-0.285) (-0.312) (-0.277) (-0.492) (-0.286) (-0.336) (-0.322) (-0.174) (-0.284) (-0.277) (-0.285) (-0.274) 
Weekday dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fama-French and Carhart factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 
R-squared 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 
Number of banks 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 
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Table 7. Main regression results (benchmark: value-weighted portfolio of 5,069 European non-financial firms). 
PANEL A: With bank fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the bank level  
Dependent variable: 3-day MAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
              
INDEX_LOSS -0.000            -0.000 
 (-0.100)            (-0.164) 
SMALL_INC  0.007***            
  (2.915)            
SMALL_DEC   -0.005           
   (-1.273)           
SMALL_ROA    -0.002          
    (-0.494)          
INDEX_E     0.002        0.003 
     (1.482)        (1.537) 
DISCR_NI      0.000        
      (0.825)        
VOLE_RATIO       -2.332       
       (-1.249)       
SKEW_RET        0.001      
        (0.538)      
INDEX_CAP         0.005    0.006 
         (1.563)    (1.608) 
DISCR_TCR          0.017    
          (1.398)    
DISCR_TIER1           0.015   
           (1.231)   
CLOSE_REG            -0.008*  
            (-1.863)  
Constant 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.007 
 (0.809) (0.749) (1.216) (1.068) (-0.261) (1.090) (0.805) (1.043) (-0.763) (0.477) (0.302) (1.186) (-1.538) 
Weekday dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fama-French and Carhart factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 
R-squared 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.031 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.035 
Number of banks 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 
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Table 7. Main regression results (benchmark: value-weighted portfolio of 5,069 European non-financial firms). (continued) 
PANEL B: Without bank fixed effects and standard errors double-clustered at the country and event level  
Dependent variable: 3-day MAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
              
INDEX_LOSS 0.000            -0.000 
 (0.006)            (-0.064) 
SMALL_INC  -0.000            
  (-0.010)            
SMALL_DEC   0.000           
   (0.031)           
SMALL_ROA    -0.000          
    (-0.004)          
INDEX_E     0.001        0.001 
     (0.454)        (0.447) 
DISCR_NI      0.000        
      (0.665)        
VOLE_RATIO       -0.389       
       (-1.326)       
SKEW_RET        -0.000      
        (-0.076)      
INDEX_CAP         -0.001    -0.001 
         (-0.428)    (-0.421) 
DISCR_TCR          -0.002    
          (-0.585)    
DISCR_TIER1           -0.002   
           (-0.616)   
CLOSE_REG            -0.005  
            (-0.648)  
Constant 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.485) (0.560) (0.544) (0.503) (0.283) (0.599) (0.554) (0.566) (0.721) (0.609) (0.619) (0.611) (0.410) 
Weekday dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fama-French and Carhart factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 
R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
Number of banks 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 
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Table 8. Results for separate regressions for each event (benchmark: DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex Europe). 
Event number 
Obs.n
s 
INDEX_LOS
S 
SMALL_IN
C 
SMALL_DE
C 
SMALL_RO
A 
INDEX_
E 
DISCR_N
I 
VOLE_RATI
O 
SKEW_RE
T 
INDEX_CA
P 
DISCR_TC
R 
DISCR_TIER
1 
CLOSE_RE
G 
1 88             
2 93         -3.698* -3.548* -4.197*  
3 93         -3.567* -2.449* -2.369*  
4 93  1.993*    2.236*   2.727* 2.505* 2.462* -2.48* 
5 94     -2.57*        
6 92      -2.872*       
7 92             
8 98             
9 114   -3.059*         -3.711* 
10 115            -2.06* 
11 115   -2.075*         -1.995* 
12 116             
13 116  -3.13*       -2.266* -3.025* -3.147*  
Total 
Observations 
1319             
Notes: All regressions include Fama-French and Carhart factors, and weekday dummies. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (Huber-White sandwich estimator).      
* denotes significance at the 5% level. Black cells indicate that the coefficient on that particular proxy is insignificant at the 5% level. 
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Table 9. Results for separate regressions for each event (benchmark: value-weighted portfolio of 5,069 European non-financial firms). 
Event number 
Obs.n
s 
INDEX_LOS
S 
SMALL_IN
C 
SMALL_DE
C 
SMALL_RO
A 
INDEX_
E 
DISCR_N
I 
VOLE_RATI
O 
SKEW_RE
T 
INDEX_CA
P 
DISCR_TC
R 
DISCR_TIER
1 
CLOSE_RE
G 
1 88             
2 93         -3.787* -3.566* -4.233*  
3 93         -3.568* -2.449* -2.369*  
4 93  2.083*    2.23*   2.671* 2.48* 2.425* -2.499* 
5 94     -2.525*        
6 92      -2.878*       
7 92             
8 98             
9 114   -3.057*         -3.71* 
10 115            -2.069* 
11 115   -2.1*         -2.004* 
12 116             
13 116  -3.13*       -2.266* -3.025* -3.147*  
Total 
Observations 
1319             
Notes: All regressions include Fama-French and Carhart factors, and weekday dummies. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (Huber-White sandwich estimator).       
* denotes significance at the 5% level. Black cells indicate that the coefficient on that particular proxy is insignificant at the 5% level. 
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Figure 1. Average 3-day MAR for each event (sample: 137 banks). 
i) Benchmark: DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index Ex Europe. 
 
ii) Benchmark: Value-weighted portfolio of 5,069 non-financial firms.
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